Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 85

Issue 2

Article 6

2020

Ending the Forever War: Resolving the Boeing-Airbus Trade
Dispute with a New Bilateral Agreement
Brooke Vaydik
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law

Recommended Citation
Brooke Vaydik, Ending the Forever War: Resolving the Boeing-Airbus Trade Dispute with a New Bilateral
Agreement, 85 J. AIR L. & COM. 355 (2020)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol85/iss2/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For
more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

ENDING THE FOREVER WAR: RESOLVING THE
BOEING-AIRBUS TRADE DISPUTE WITH A
NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENT
BROOKE VAYDIK*

ABSTRACT
In today’s ever-connected and increasingly global economy,
there is a strong need for cooperation in bilateral and multilateral trade exchanges, but international trade disputes have
arisen in the context of many industries, goods, and services.
Over the last two decades, the European Union (EU) and the
United States have been embroiled in a complicated dispute
over subsidies given to their largest commercial airline manufacturers, a practice that both governments have engaged in
heavily.
Increased global reliance on air travel, coupled with the dominance of few companies worldwide, has raised the stakes for
maintaining innovation and profitability. Both the EU and the
United States have each sought to protect their largest aircraft
manufacturers with favorable government grants while at the
same time condemning the other’s use of the same tactics.
These subsidies on both sides of the Atlantic have been the subject of dueling complaints at the World Trade Organization
(WTO) that have recently come to a head. The WTO has found
that both the EU and the United States are in violation of a 1992
agreement that prohibits the use of subsidies in the aircraft
manufacturing industry, findings that have paved the way for
both the EU and the United States to retaliate against each
other using tariffs.
* Winner, 2020 International Aviation Womens Association Scholarship. J.D.
Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2021; B.A. Political Science,
Boston University. Thanks to my husband, Michael Rossi, for his constant support
and encouragement. Thank you also to the incredible staff of the SMU Law
Review Association for their hard work and dedication.
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This Comment seeks to explore a solution to this dispute by
suggesting a new bilateral trade agreement between the two governments. The devastating effects of prolonging the dispute
even more, compounded by the already heightened tensions between the two governments on the world stage, underscore the
urgency of coming to a new bilateral agreement specific to civilian aircraft. Because it is unlikely that the EU and the United
States will actually abandon the practice of subsidizing their respective aircraft manufacturers—especially in a time of uncertainty and turmoil in the large civilian aircraft industry—it is
important that the two governments clearly define what will be
acceptable moving forward and agree to adhere to such terms.
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VI.
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I. INTRODUCTION
N TODAY’S EVER-CONNECTED and increasingly global
economy, there is a strong need for cooperation in bilateral
and multilateral trade exchanges. On the most basic level, the
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success of many countries’ domestic industries often depends
on access to, and success in, the global market. Further, trade
agreements between nations can benefit consumers as well—imports often give consumers more choices and reduce the cost of
goods.1 So it is understandable that obtaining favorable terms in
international trade deals has long been the object of many countries’ participation at the global bargaining table.
International trade disputes have arisen in the context of
many industries, goods and services. At one point or another
over the last half century, automobiles,2 lumber,3 tires,4 and
even bananas5 have been the subject of a serious trade dispute
between the United States and other nations. These disputes
can drag on for decades, embroiling multiple political administrations and sometimes having an impact on industries outside
of those that are the subject of the dispute. This is certainly the
case for the almost twenty-year trade war between the United
States and the EU centered around large civilian aircraft. Although the WTO, the global trade governing body that is responsible for enforcing bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements, has played a part in mediating the dispute and attempting to hold both the EU and the United States to commitments they have made to each other in the past, these
enforcement mechanisms have proven to be less than successful
as the trade war reaches its culmination.
The business of commercial aircraft has frequently been a
controversial and fraught endeavor. Increased global reliance
Jeffrey J. Schott, Trade Agreements Benefit Consumers and Producers, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/03/17/aretrade-agreements-good-for-americans [https://perma.cc/63BR-Q2NC].
2 See David E. Sanger, A Deal on Auto Trade: The Agreement; U.S. Settles Trade
Dispute, Averting Billions in Tariffs on Japanese Luxury Autos, N.Y. TIMES (June 29,
1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/29/us/deal-auto-trade-agreement-ussettles-trade-dispute-averting-billions-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/82LHX9GY].
3 See Bryce Baschuk, WTO Delivers Mixed Ruling in U.S.-Canada Lumber Dispute,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0409/wto-delivers-mixed-ruling-in-u-s-canada-lumber-dispute [https://perma.cc/
6LLL-QAHH].
4 See Keith Bradsher, China Moves to Retaliate Against U.S. Tire Tariff, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 13, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/business/global/14
trade.html [https://perma.cc/834Y-27LN].
5 See Anthony Depalma, U.S. and Europeans Agree on Deal to End Banana Trade
War, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/12/business/us-and-europeans-agree-on-deal-to-end-banana-trade-war.html [https://
perma.cc/3WCJ-F6J8].
1
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on air travel, coupled with the dominance of few companies
worldwide, has raised the stakes for maintaining innovation and
profitability. Both the EU and the United States have each
sought to protect their largest aircraft manufacturers with
favorable government grants while at the same time condemning the other’s use of the same tactics.6 In the United States,
The Boeing Company (Boeing) has benefitted from numerous
state tax breaks designed to keep manufacturing in the United
States and make their products competitive in the global market.7 The U.S. federal government has also given more direct
handouts to Boeing in the form of research grants and other
contracts for services.8 In the EU, Airbus SE (Airbus) has received favorable loan terms from multiple EU governments in
order to finance the development and manufacture of new aircraft models, often at lower-than-normal interest rates with very
lenient payback terms.9
These subsidies on both sides of the Atlantic have been the
subject of dueling complaints at the WTO that have recently
come to a head.10 The WTO has found that both governments
are in violation of a 1992 agreement that prohibits the use of
subsidies in the aircraft manufacturing industry, findings that
have paved the way for both the EU and the United States to
retaliate against each other using tariffs.11 In October 2019, the
6 See, e.g., EU Threatens Escalation in Tariff Fight Over Boeing and Airbus Subsidies,
BBC NEWS (July 6, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53309937
[https://perma.cc/54Z2-EEGV].
7 See,
e.g., Subsidy Tracker: Boeing, GOOD JOBS FIRST, https://subsidytracker.goodjobsfirst.org/parent/boeing [https://perma.cc/CM5T-Y48G]; Dominic Gates, Huge Tax Breaks for Aerospace Didn’t Deliver Many New Jobs, SEATTLE
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2007), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aero
space/huge-tax-breaks-for-aerospace-didnt-deliver-many-new-jobs/ [https://
perma.cc/HR3D-FL7J].
8 Subsidy Tracker: Boeing, supra note 7.
9 Carol Matlack, European Taxpayers May Pay the Price for Airbus A380’s Demise,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201903-08/european-taxpayers-face-hard-landing-from-airbus-a380-s-demise [https://
perma.cc/SV88-QH5P].
10 See, e.g., EU Threatens Escalation in Tariff Fight Over Boeing and Airbus Subsidies,
supra note 6; David J. Lynch, U.S. Can Impose Tariffs on $7.5 Billion in Goods Because
E.U. Gave Illegal Subsidies to Airbus, WTO Rules, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-united-states-can-impose-tariffs-on-75-billion-in-goods-because-european-union-gave-illegal-subsidies-to-airbuswto-rules/2019/10/02/021edc06-e51d-11e9-b403-f738899982d2_story.html
[https://perma.cc/G2F3-XLMG].
11 Jonas Ekblom, Timeline: Highlights of the 15-year Airbus, Boeing Trade War,
REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wto-aircraft-time
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WTO granted the United States permission to retaliate with $7.5
billion worth of tariffs on everything from wine and cheese to
aircraft themselves.12 A decision allowing the EU to retaliate in a
similar fashion was expected from the WTO in May 2020,13 further escalating the decades-long dispute and potentially harming worldwide industries and consumers in the process. Due to
the worldwide outbreak of the virus COVID-19, this decision has
been delayed.14
This Comment seeks to explore a solution to this dispute by
suggesting a new bilateral trade agreement between the two governments. A new agreement specific to aircraft manufacturing
subsidies is necessary and is superior to the current alternatives
for two reasons. First, the United States and the EU have both
signaled that they are unwilling to completely abandon the practice of subsidizing their aircraft manufacturers. Therefore, both
sides must agree not necessarily to completely end the practice,
but rather on what level of subsidization is acceptable given the
economic realities that each government is facing. Second, moving forward and continuing to impose tariffs on broad categories of goods and services will only serve to hurt the
manufacturers, the airliners that purchase goods from them,
and the customers they serve. The United States needs to agree
to rescind the tariffs that have already been implemented, and
the EU must avoid moving forward with any retaliatory tariffs
they are given permission to impose in order to bring predictability and stability back to the large civilian aircraft market.
In order to expand on these issues, Part II gives a summary of
the subsidies to both Boeing and Airbus that gave rise to the
decades long dispute. Next, Part III details the international
trade framework, discussing the major agreements that make up
the framework as well as the enforcement mechanisms at its disposal. Part IV then discusses the current state of the dispute between the United States and the EU against the backdrop of this
framework while also detailing the obstacles that complicate curline/timeline-highlights-of-the-15-year-airbus-boeing-trade-war-idUSKBN1WH198
[perma.cc/35JA-GNHY].
12 Lynch, supra note 10.
13 Eric M. Johnson, Washington State Acts to Drop Boeing Tax Break to Head off EU
Tariffs, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2020), https://ar.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN20D2
LC [https://perma.cc/QA2K-FM4L].
14 Philip Blenkinsop, EU is ‘Very Concerned’ by Delayed WTO Decision on Tariffs vs
U.S., REUTERS (June 25, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-eu/
eu-is-very-concerned-by-delayed-wto-decision-on-tariffs-vs-u-s-idUSKBN23W2L7
[https://perma.cc/M3DR-ECGB].
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rent negotiations. Part V criticizes the recent efforts at resolving
the dispute and presents suggestions for a bilateral agreement
between the two governments. Finally, Part VI concludes the
article.
II.

SUBSIDIES AT THE HEART OF THE
BOEING-AIRBUS DISPUTE

The dispute between Boeing and Airbus for many years has
gone deeper than a surface level disagreement about trade policy. Boeing and Airbus together represent the two largest commercial aircraft manufacturers in the world—accounting for
around 90% of the market share globally15—with Airbus recently overtaking Boeing for the top spot for the first time since
its founding in 1970.16 At its core, the fight is over which aircraft
manufacturer will continue to dominate the global market in
the coming decades.
A.

BOEING’S HISTORY

OF

RELIANCE

ON

STATE TAX BREAKS

Boeing, founded and headquartered in the United States, was
for most of the twentieth century the world’s only commercial
aircraft manufacturer.17 Since its founding, Boeing has been a
significant contributor to the U.S. economy, employing 161,133
people in the United States and over 70,000 in Washington state
alone.18 As a result, the U.S. government and the governments
of many states consider the financial health of Boeing to be crucial to the health of the greater U.S. economy. This has led the
United States and its state governments to implement significant
economic incentives in order to keep Boeing’s business in the
United States and its financial health in order.19
15 Trefis Team, How Airbus Has Grown Over the Years to Dethrone Boeing as the
Largest Commercial Aircraft Maker, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/greatspeculations/2020/01/06/how-airbus-has-grown-over-the-years-to-de
throne-boeing-as-the-largest-commercial-aircraft-maker/#7b999e203a59
[perma.cc/P6TF-ADRB].
16 Id.
17 See Boeing History Chronology, BOEING.COM, http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/history/pdf/Boeing_Chronology.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/R9VN-RMWC].
18 General
Information: Employment Data, BOEING.COM, https://
www.boeing.com/company/general-info/#/employment-data [perma.cc/3RRK4ZUW].
19 See Michael Hiltzik, Boeing Got a Record Tax Break from Washington State and
Cut Jobs Anyway. Now the State Wants to Strike Back, L.A. TIMES (May 3, 2017),
https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-boeing-washington-2017
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Because of the large number of manufacturing and corporate
jobs that a Boeing plant or office can bring to a state, many U.S.
states have created incentives for Boeing to either keep their
operations in a particular location or to develop new operations
elsewhere. Three states in particular have been the primary contributors to Boeing’s business in the form of tax breaks and state
subsidies: Washington State, South Carolina, and Missouri.20
Washington State has by far been the biggest state boost to Boeing’s operations, offering more than $12.5 billion in subsidies in
the form of tax breaks and other monetary awards.21 For example, in 2003, Washington granted a $3.2 billion subsidy package—the largest in the state’s history—to Boeing for the
construction of Boeing’s new 777X jet in the state.22 The tax
incentives faced swift scrutiny and condemnation from some
politicians and others who claimed that the large incentives
were unnecessary, arguing that it was unlikely that Boeing would
move production even without the tax breaks.23 Similarly, South
Carolina’s state legislature passed over $800 million in tax incentives to entice Boeing to build a second manufacturing site for
its 787 Dreamliner in the state.24 Unlike the Washington State
tax break, the South Carolina incentives were tied directly to
Boeing’s ability and will to maintain jobs within the state.25 Figure 1 below details the long history of state tax breaks to Boeing,
reflecting the total amount of awards from 1994 to the present
day.26

0503-story.html [https://perma.cc/ARB6-UUBM]; Curtis Tate, Boeing is Top Winner of State, Local Tax Breaks, MCCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU (Mar. 17, 2015), https://
www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/economy/article
24781525.html [https://perma.cc/8KEX-5LQR].
20 Subsidy Tracker: Boeing, supra note 7.
21 Id.
22 See Hiltzik, supra note 19; Andrew Garber, Legislature Approves Tax Breaks to
Secure Boeing 777X, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013), https://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/legislature-approves-tax-breaks-to-secure-boeing-777x/ [perma.cc/
W534-K56X].
23 Id.
24 Boeing’s Charleston Tax Breaks Top $800M; 60 Years and Counting for Airplane
Tax Break, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 23, 2010), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeings-charleston-tax-breaks-top-800m-60-years-and-counting-for-airplanetax-break/ [perma.cc/A85H-GPZ4].
25 Hiltzik, supra note 19.
26 Subsidy Tracker: Boeing, supra note 7.
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Figure 1
State

Total Amount of
Subsidies

Number of
Awards

Washington State

$12,526,999,303

40

South Carolina

$1,020,000,000

3

Missouri

$255,797,275

5

Texas

$155,000,000

2

Alabama

$150,000,000

1

Other

$227,769,756

121

In addition to support from state and local governments, Boeing has enjoyed subsidies from the federal government and its
agencies as well. Since 2000, the federal government has
awarded over $570 million in subsidies to Boeing.27 The contracts that Boeing receives from the federal government are
often contracts for advanced research. For example, over the
past twenty years, Boeing has continually received research
grants from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) for the Space Program, the Department of Defense for
its Air Force Defense and Research Sciences Program, and the
Department of Energy for its Fossil Energy Research and Development Program.28 While the amount of these grants pales in
comparison to the value of the tax breaks given by state governments to lure in manufacturing jobs, the grants still contribute
to the overall financial stability of Boeing and its ability to continue to build large civilian aircraft. Boeing also receives additional grants from the federal government for military
procurement purposes, but these grants are not considered to
benefit the company’s large civilian aircraft division.29 Figure 2
Id.
Id.
29 See, e.g., Aaron Gregg, Air Force Turns to Boeing for $9.2 Billion Training Jet
Program, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/09/27/air-force-turns-boeing-billion-training-aircraft-contract/ [per
ma.cc/3MYF-8DZ9]; Trefis Team, How Much of Boeing’s Revenues Comes From the
U.S. Government?, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/great
speculations/2020/01/02/how-much-of-boeings-revenues-comes-from-the-usgovernment/#2722d33d5144 [perma.cc/4CJ9-9DDJ]; Amanda Macias, Boeing Cleaned Up on Pentagon Contracts This Summer. Here are Some of the Big-Ticket Buys,
CNBC (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/09/boeing-bagged-billions-in-pentagon-contracts-this-summer.html [perma.cc/SMX8-EC5M].
27
28
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shows the total amount of subsidies given to Boeing by the federal government since 2000.30
Figure 2
Entity

Total Amount of Subsidies

Department of Defense

$380,751,554

NASA

$103,359,118

Department of Energy

$71,067,225

Other

$19,500

B.

AIRBUS’S SUCCESS USING GOVERNMENTAL LOANS

Airbus has similar support from its home region. Originally a
consortium of several different airplane manufacturers, Airbus
was founded in Europe in 1969 in response to the American
domination of the commercial aircraft manufacturing industry.31 Since its founding, Airbus’s market share in the global industry has steadily increased, going from just 15% in 1987 to
around 45% today.32 Most of Airbus’s employees are based in
Europe, with over 103,500 employed in the EU alone.33 As a result, Airbus’s regional presence in the EU and its contribution
to the economies of its member states have created a strong incentive for the European nations to contribute to the success of
the company in whatever way they can.
The biggest financial incentive that Airbus receives from EU
nations comes in the form of low interest loans with extremely
favorable terms.34 Specifically, Airbus secured over $3.7 billion
in loans from EU nations in 2002 as an investment in its new
A380, a civilian aircraft that was specifically designed to rival
Subsidy Tracker: Boeing, supra note 7.
See David Slotnick, Airbus Is One of the Most Powerful Companies in Aviation.
Here’s a Closer Look at Its Rise from Upstart to Industry Titan, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 27,
2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/airbus-history-airliner-photos-details2019-5 [perma.cc/88AR-P62X].
32 Jeffrey D. Kienstra, Comment, Cleared for Landing: Airbus, Boeing, and the
WTO Dispute Over Subsidies to Large Civil Aircraft, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 569, 577
(2012); Trefis Team, How Will Boeing Gain Market Share?, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/02/21/how-will-boeinggain-market-share/#714d373d1e9b [perma.cc/RW8L-T2RQ].
33 See Worldwide Presence, AIRBUS.COM, https://www.airbus.com/company/
worldwide-presence.html [perma.cc/99AN-LPTJ].
34 Matlack, supra note 9.
30
31
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Boeing’s long-haul passenger offerings like the 747.35 Germany
loaned 942 million euros, France and Spain loaned 1.21 billion
and 376 million euros, respectively, and the United Kingdom
loaned 530 million pounds.36 These loans allegedly were offered
at below-market rates, with an obligation to repay the loans only
if the aircraft was commercially successful.37 Additionally, Airbus
has received support from EU governments in the form of infrastructure and commercial property grants from all four main
European governments that have contributed to its financial
success and ability to develop more civilian aircraft projects.38
Specifically, these grants include “certain infrastructure measures . . . namely, the lease of land . . . in Hamburg, the right to
exclusive use of an extended runway at Bremen Airport, regional grants by the German authorities in Nordenham, and
Spanish government grants and regional grants . . . .”39
Making the dispute more complicated and potentially more
consequential are broader disagreements about politics and the
role of governments in supporting their national economies.40
Traditionally, the United States has been theoretically opposed
to public involvement in private business, while European nations have embraced the role of the government in supporting
industry.41 Despite a supposed idealistic opposition to government subsidies and involvement in private businesses, the
United States has kept pace with the EU in protecting and investing in its aviation crown jewel.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE FRAMEWORK
The importance of the Boeing-Airbus dispute cannot be understood without a brief description of the structure of the
35 See id.; Angela Charlton & Jonathan Gambrell, Airbus Announces It Will Stop
Making Struggling A380 Superjumbo in 2021, USA TODAY (Feb. 14, 2019), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/money /business/2019/02/14/airbus-to-stop-makingsuperjumbo/2867953002/ [https://perma.cc/M88Y-SRZ8].
36 Matlack, supra note 9.
37 See Sylvia Pfeifer, Airbus Chief Signals Tough Stance on A380 Loans, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/c74422ee-4102-11e9-9beeefab61506f44 [perma.cc/H629-9BW7].
38 Gregory Polek, WTO Rules European Subsidies to Airbus Illegal, AVIATION INT’L
NEWS (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aerospace/
2016-09-22/wto-rules-european-subsidies-airbus-illegal [perma.cc/5KF2-725C].
39 Id.
40 See Nils Meier-Kaienburg, The WTO’s “Toughest” Case: An Examination of the
Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Resolution Procedure in the Airbus-Boeing Dispute Over
Aircraft Subsidies, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 191, 196 (2006).
41 Id.
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WTO itself and its dispute resolution process. Before the WTO
was founded in 1995, the primary governing law concerning international trade was the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), which had been in place since 1948.42 The primary objective of GATT was to liberalize international trade by
reducing tariffs and allowing countries previously unable to
trade multilaterally to participate in the international market.43
GATT largely succeeded, but there were unforeseen consequences. By the mid-1990s, countries were becoming concerned
about the increased foreign competition that GATT had enabled, and as a result, many turned to protectionist policies to
keep out these foreign competitors.44 It was clear that modifications to GATT, or an entirely new agreement, needed to be
made.
A.

POST-GATT BILATERAL AIRCRAFT AGREEMENT

In an attempt to solve the protectionist tendencies of countries under GATT, the EU and the United States signed on to a
separate agreement that governed the civilian aircraft industry.
The 1992 Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (1992
Agreement),45 signed by the EU and the United States, was designed to fill gaps left by previous agreements that had led to
protectionist and overreaching subsidies in the civilian aircraft
manufacturing industry.46 The new agreement was designed to
clarify how much support, financial or otherwise, a country
could contribute to a new aircraft’s development.47
The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm [perma.cc/HWN6EBLH].
43 See id.
44 Id.
45 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the European Economic Community Concerning the Application of the GATT
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, EC-U.S.,
July 17, 1992, 1992 O.J. (L 301) 32 [hereinafter 1992 Agreement]. The United
States terminated the 1992 Agreement with the EU on October 6, 2004. Int’l
Trade Admin., Enforcement and Compliance: European Union Agreement on Trade in
Large Civil Aircraft, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. TRADE AGREEMENTS COMPLIANCE PROGRAM,
https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_
002816.asp [https://perma.cc/N6L4-7AQL].
46 Daniel I. Fisher, Note, “Super Jumbo” Problem: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle for
the Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865, 874–75 (2002); MeierKaienburg, supra note 40, at 211.
47 Meier-Kaienberg, supra note 40, at 202.
42
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The primary reason for the new agreement was a heightened
desire from the United States to protect the domestic civilian
aircraft market in light of increased pressure from Europeanbacked Airbus.48 Because they recognized that waiting for the
United States to move forward with a dispute resolution under
GATT would likely be harmful to the overall EU–U.S. relationship, the EU sought a bilateral agreement that would fill in the
gaps left by GATT and previous agreements on the amount of
subsidies that would be acceptable in the large civilian aircraft
market.49 While the agreement was intended to ease the pressure on the bilateral relationship, the primary object was not to
equalize the two parties in the civilian aircraft market; rather,
the objective was to clearly define what would constitute an illegal subsidy.50
Despite the lofty goals of the negotiations, the 1992 Agreement did not solve the growing problem created by both parties’
continued aircraft subsidies. While the agreement capped a
country’s ability to contribute to the financing of new aircraft at
33% of the total cost,51 the agreement, like GATT, failed to give
a clear cut definition of a subsidy and what “constitute[d] ‘government support.’”52 Both parties had small victories, however.
The EU promised that Airbus would have to pay back any loans
received from EU governments at the market rate or above, and
the United States acknowledged that “indirect subsidies” from
federal agencies were subject to “international discipline,”
bringing them under the authority of a trade agreement for the
first time.53 Although the agreement represented a small step
forward in the negotiating process, the United States quickly became unsatisfied with its impact on the subsidy issue and immediately began seeking an alternative that would not leave the
success of their largest source of exports to the mercy of another
country’s “good faith.”54

Fisher, supra note 46, at 874.
Meier-Kaienberg, supra note 40, at 200.
50 Id.
51 See generally 1992 Agreement, supra note 45, art. 4.
52 Meier-Kaienberg, supra note 40, at 200.
53 Id.
54 U.S.
GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-95-45, LONG-TERM VIABILITY
U.S.–EUROPEAN UNION AIRCRAFT AGREEMENT UNCERTAIN 3 (Dec. 1994).
48
49
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THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISM

The WTO was created on January 1, 1995, replacing GATT as
the primary governing authority for international trade.55 Like
GATT, the WTO covers trade in goods, but it extends this coverage to services and intellectual property and creates a new dispute resolution process for its participating nations.56 This
dispute resolution process is a cornerstone of the WTO. It was
designed to enable member nations to effectively enforce trade
agreements using neutral arbiters and evaluations and is a vast
improvement over the previous process built into GATT, which
required the consensus of member nations in order to hand
down a ruling.57 Its central objective is “to provide security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system” through quick
and efficient independent rulings that are binding on its member states.58 While the WTO adjudicatory rulings apply to the
member states, they are not binding in the sense that a member
state must reverse the trade policies that led to the violation.
States “can maintain their policies that breach the trade rules
and simply accept retaliatory actions from injured states.” 59 The
new system also bans unilateral action by any member state, requiring authorization from the adjudicatory panel for any retaliation to international trade violations.60
The WTO dispute resolution and settlement process (Dispute
Settlement Understanding) has three main components: the
consultation phase, the panel phase, and the implementation
phase.61 A party seeking to adjudicate its trade dispute through
the WTO must first request a consultation by precisely identifying the issues and the legal bases for the complaint.62 During
this consultation phase, the complaining party and the party accused of the violation must engage in discussions and attempt to
settle the dispute for sixty days; if the agreement deals with per55 History of the Multilateral Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/history_e/history_e.htm [perma.cc/QA6KA9CL].
56 Id.
57 Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying Compliance: Why and When the
United States Complies with WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 201, 205 (2014).
58 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 5 (2d ed. 2017).
59 Brewster & Chilton, supra note 57, at 206.
60 Id. at 207.
61 Id. at 207–9.
62 Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 40, at 211.
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ishable goods, the process is shortened to twenty days.63 If the
dispute is not resolved through this consultation process, the
parties then move to perhaps the longest and most substantive
part of the dispute resolution process—the panel phase.64
The panel phase begins the core adjudicatory process of the
WTO dispute resolution. During the panel phase, parties choose
individual panel members to arbitrate the dispute and ultimately issue a final ruling.65 The ruling is appealable, but if the
decision is not appealed, the body will adopt the decision under
a “reverse consensus” rule.66 This is the primary difference between the dispute resolution process under GATT and the current process under the WTO. Previously, there had to be a
consensus in order to adopt the ruling; now, a consensus is only
required to reject a ruling.67 The process of adopting a ruling is
now seen as an almost automatic process; scholars have noted
that the reverse consensus rule has never led to the rejection of
a panel ruling.68
Once a panel ruling has been adopted, the parties involved
may appeal the ruling to a standing appellate body (Appellate
Body) made up of “persons of recognized authority, with
demonstrated expertise in . . . the subject matter of the covered
agreements generally.”69 The Appellate Body has ninety days to
consider whether to adopt the ruling;70 however, in cases where
there are alleged illegal subsidies in dispute, the WTO provides
a “fast track” procedure that reduces the time-table for appealing prohibited subsidy cases to thirty days.71 The Appellate Body
can either accept or reverse the panel’s ruling but has no remand authority back to the panel.72 If there is no appeal at all,
63 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, arts. 4.7, 4.8, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
64 Id. art. 6.
65 Id. art. 8.
66 Id. art. 16; Brewster & Chilton, supra note 57, at 208.
67 Brewster & Chilton, supra note 57, at 207 n.16.
68 Id. at 208.
69 DSU, supra note 63, art. 17.3.
70 Id. art. 17.5.
71 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 4.9, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter Subsidies Agreement]; DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 212 (2d ed. 2004).
72 DSU, supra note 63, art. 17.13.
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then the panel’s ruling is considered adopted.73 If the ruling
found that a party’s trade measure was “inconsistent with [the
requirements of] a covered agreement,” the panel will recommend that the concerned party bring its policy into conformity.74 In the case of alleged prohibited subsidies, the subsidy
must be withdrawn “without delay,” reflecting the generally accelerated timetable that governs disputes on subsidies.75
The issue, however, with panel and appellate rulings at the
WTO is that they are not “binding” in the traditional sense. As
one scholar has said, “[t]he WTO has no jailhouse, no bail
bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear gas.”76 Thus,
the WTO and its panels must rely on the parties to voluntarily
bring their trade measures into compliance with the rulings.
Remedies prescribed by the rulings are prospective and look to
address future harms that would occur as a result of the trade
measure.77 Typically, the preferred remedy is for a complete
withdrawal of the offending measure either immediately or
“within a reasonable period of time.”78 If the offending member
state refuses or fails to comply with the order to withdrawal, two
other remedies are available: compensation and retaliatory
countermeasures.79
The WTO envisions compensation not as monetary restitution
for past harms, but rather as compensation in the form of “trade
advantages to be granted in future.”80 Parties are required to
enter into negotiation to attempt to find appropriate compensation, but if they are unable to agree, the harmed party is entitled
to take countermeasures.81 These countermeasures must be authorized by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), although authorization has historically been granted
automatically.82 Typically, the move from a ruling to counterId. art. 19.1.
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 71, at 154.
75 Subsidies Agreement, supra note 71, art. 4.7.
76 SHARIF BHUIYAN, NATIONAL LAW IN WTO LAW: EFFECTIVENESS AND GOOD
GOVERNANCE IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109 (2007) (quoting Judith Bello,
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 416
(1996)).
77 Id.
78 DSU, supra note 63, arts. 3.7, 22.
79 Id. art. 3; BHUIYAN, supra note 76, at 110.
80 BHUIYAN, supra note 76, at 110.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 111 (“The DSB . . . is to act under the negative consensus rule [in
authorizing countermeasures] and accordingly, if requested, authorization is
granted automatically.”).
73
74
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measures is almost immediate, as “the complainant often relinquishes its right to negotiate compensation and directly requests
the authorisation to retaliate.”83
C.

RETALIATION

AT THE

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Like the other remedies prescribed by the DSB, retaliation is
envisioned to be a prospective remedy; additionally, any retaliation undertaken by a member party should be temporary in nature and may only remain in place as long as there is
noncompliance with the DSB’s ruling.84 The DSU stipulates that
any retaliation by member parties should not be punitive and
instead should merely be “equivalent to the level of the . . . impairment.”85 Additionally, the party seeking permission to retaliate should seek retaliation in the “same sector” as the one in
which the DSB found a violation; however, if the party finds that
to be either impracticable or ineffective, the party may retaliate
in sectors that are covered under the same agreement.86 The
complaining party must identify why retaliation in the same sector would not be effective in inducing compliance.87 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies
Agreement) has “special and additional rules” for retaliation in
cases that involve bilateral and multilateral disputes over
subsidies.88
Retaliation by any nation is intended to be a “last resort” and
is not supposed to be punitive in nature.89 But while the
amounts approved by the arbitration panel cannot cross into
this punitive territory, they are intended to be strong and severe
enough to induce compliance.90 The Subsidies Agreement does
not add much clarity to exactly how retaliatory a countermeasure can be before it is considered punitive; arbitrators who
have issued decisions under the Subsidies Agreement have
mostly determined that a countermeasure should be large
enough to “counter the measure at issue . . . or counteract its
83 MICHELLE LIMENTA, WTO RETALIATION: EFFECTIVENESS AND PURPOSES 26
(2017).
84 See id.; DSU, supra note 63, art. 22.2.
85 DSU, supra note 63, art. 22.4.
86 Id. art. 22.3.
87 LIMENTA, supra note 83, at 34.
88 Id. at 26 (citing Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil—Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 3.5, WTO Doc. WT/0S46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2020)).
89 See id. at 27.
90 Id. at 34.
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effect on the affected party, or both.”91 Thus, the countermeasure should correspond to the amount of the violative subsidy
and not necessarily the harm that was inflicted by the subsidy.92
The countermeasure may be more than the subsidy’s
“equivalent,” but cannot be “disproportionate.”93 The language
of the Subsidies Agreement clearly leaves much room for interpretation. As a result, the Agreement does not provide an adequate or workable guideline for difficult and politically fraught
disputes between governments like the current dispute over civilian aircraft manufacturing.
IV.

THE PATH TO THE CURRENT STALEMATE

While the rivalry between Boeing and Airbus had been strong
since Airbus was founded in 1970, it escalated greatly when the
United States filed the first complaint about the EU’s practice of
subsidizing Airbus in 2004.94 Specifically, the U.S. Trade Representative (Trade Representative) alleged that France, Germany,
Spain, and the United Kingdom were providing financing to
Airbus “for projects that would otherwise not be commercially
feasible.”95 This financing, the United States alleged, was secured in violation of the Subsidies Agreement, to which both
the United States and the EU are parties.96
The Subsidies Agreement defines a subsidy as: “(i) a financial
contribution (ii) by a government or any public body within the
territory of a Member (iii) which confers a benefit.”97 In order
to violate the agreement, the subsidy must be given “at the direction of a government or any public body within the territory of a
Member” and must be specific to an enterprise, region, or industry; alternatively, a subsidy violates the agreement when it is
“prohibited,” or targets export goods generally.98 The subsidies
covered by the agreement fall into two categories: prohibited
subsidies, which are violative per se, and actionable subsidies,
Id. at 38 (referencing Subsidies Agreement, supra note 71, art. 4.10).
Id. at 39.
93 Id. at 40–41.
94 See Ekblom, supra note 11.
95 Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities and
Certain Member States–Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 1, WTO Doc.
WT/DS316/1 (Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Original U.S. Complaint].
96 Id.; see generally Subsidies Agreement, supra note 71.
97 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Overview, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm [perma.cc/DP3Z-MJ3A]; see
also Subsidies Agreement, supra note 71, art. 1.
98 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Overview, supra note 97.
91
92
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which are subject to challenge through dispute resolution channels or “countervailing action.”99 Actionable subsidies are only
subject to dispute resolution if they have “adverse effects to the
interests of other Members,” which includes injury to another
Member’s domestic industry.100
A.

DUELING COMPLAINTS

In its request for consultation, the United States claimed that
EU governments had given Airbus grants and government-provided services “to develop, expand, and upgrade Airbus manufacturing sites for the development and production of the
Airbus A380,”101 a large, long-haul aircraft specifically designed
to cut into the market of the Boeing 747.102 In addition to subsidies granted for the A380, the United States alleged that EU
governments had given loans with preferential terms to Airbus
in order to finance the A380 and at least four other aircraft
models.103 The United States further alleged that these subsidies
were “export subsidies in breach of . . . the [Subsidies] Agreement,” and that they threatened to cause adverse effects in the
form of “serious prejudice to the interests of the United States
through displacement . . . of US imports of large civil aircraft
into the [EU].”104
Shortly after, the EU filed its own complaint accusing the
United States of providing illegal subsidies to Boeing.105 Specifically, the EU alleged that the state and local tax breaks provided
by Kansas, Washington, and Illinois before 2004 amounted to
actionable subsidies under the Subsidies Agreement.106 In addition to the tax breaks, the EU cited the subsidies and generous
contracts provided by NASA, the Department of Defense, and
Id.
Subsidies Agreement, supra note 71, art. 5.
101 Original U.S. Complaint, supra note 95, at 2.
102 Robert Wall, Airbus to Retire the A380, the Superjumbo That Never Quite Took
Off; After Billions of Dollars of Investment, Airbus Is Retiring a Plane It Had Hoped
Would Supplant Boeing’s 747, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/airbus-will-stop-building-its-a380-superjumbo-jet-11550121699 [per
ma.cc/594D-MDTS].
103 Original U.S. Complaint, supra note 95, at 2. In addition to financing the
A380, the United States alleged that these preferential loan terms were secured
to finance the A320, A321, and A330/340. Id.
104 Id. at 2–3.
105 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS/317/1/Add.1
(July 1, 2005).
106 Id. at 1–2.
99

100
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the Department of Commerce.107 The EU complaint essentially
alleged the same adverse effects as the U.S. complaint; namely,
that the U.S. subsidies were impeding the export of European
civilian aircraft products and were causing lost sales in markets
that would ordinarily purchase Airbus products.108 As a result of
the two individual complaints, the parties requesting consultations (EU and United States) entered into mandated bilateral
consultations; however, these consultations failed, and the WTO
began two separate investigations into public funding of Airbus
and Boeing in 2005.109
Despite the fact that the Dispute Settlement Understanding
prescribes specific timelines for dispute settlement and panel investigations, a panel report on the U.S. complaint was not circulated until June 2010, four years after the establishment of the
panel itself.110 In its report on the U.S. complaint, the panel
found that the measures taken by EU governments to give
grants and services in order to facilitate the manufacture of new
Airbus models constituted a prohibited subsidy under the Subsidies Agreement.111 Although the panel found that some of the
financing terms guaranteed by government banks qualified as
actionable specific subsidies under the Subsidies Agreement,
the panel nonetheless found that these subsidies did not have
significant enough adverse effects on the U.S. domestic civilian
aircraft market to qualify as a breach of the agreement.112
As expected, the EU appealed the panel’s report to the WTO
Appellate Body, who affirmed the panel’s report in May 2011.113
The DSB ordered that the EU bring its trade measures into compliance within the timeframe set out in the Subsidies Agreement; the EU agreed, and began implementation in December
2011.114 Despite this, the United States requested the establishId. at 2–5.
See id. at 5.
109 See Ekblom, supra note 11.
110 European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in
Large Civil Aircraft, WORLD TRADE ORG. [hereinafter WTO Dispute Summary],
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm [per
ma.cc/9H7B-J9EX].
111 Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 1046–49, WTO Doc. WT/DS316/R (adopted
June 1, 2011) [hereinafter First Panel Report]; see also Kienstra, supra note 32, at
594.
112 First Panel Report, supra note 111, at 1049.
113 WTO Dispute Summary, supra note 110.
114 Id.
107
108
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ment of a compliance panel.115 In April 2012, a compliance
panel was formed to determine whether the EU was duly attempting to comply with the DSB’s order to bring their trade
measures into compliance.116 Because of the complexities of the
alleged subsidies and the markets involved in the dispute, it took
over four years for the compliance panel to issue its report,
which found that the EU was not in compliance with its earlier
rulings on Airbus subsidies.117 Despite assurances from the EU
that attempts to comply were ongoing, the WTO issued rulings
in 2016 and again in 2018 stating that the EU continued to defy
orders to bring their programs supporting Airbus into
compliance.118
At the same time as they were adjudicating the U.S. complaint
against the EU, the WTO was also considering the counter-case
filed by the EU in 2004.119 In 2011, while the WTO Appellate
Body was considering the EU’s appeal of the initial ruling in the
U.S. case, the panel handling the EU’s initial complaint ruled
that “at least $5.3 billion . . . in research grants and tax breaks
given to Boeing constitute[d] illegal subsidies.”120 Despite the
fact that the ruling was a victory for the EU on its face, the EU
immediately appealed and asked for the WTO to find that all of
the subsidies laid out in the original complaint—around $16 billion—were violative measures under the Subsidies Agreement.121 Ultimately, the original decision of the panel was
upheld, and the United States was ordered to bring their measures into compliance.122
The EU opened up another case against the United States in
2014, separate from their main complaint, alleging that the record-breaking tax incentives given to Boeing by Washington
State were outright “prohibited” subsidies under the Subsidies
Agreement.123 The WTO panel established to hear this complaint agreed, but the case against the 777X tax breaks was
stopped when the Appellate Body reversed the panel finding in
Id.
Id.
117 Id.
118 Ekblom, supra note 11.
119 Id.
120 Toby Vogel, EU Claims Subsidies Victory in Boeing Case, POLITICO (Mar. 31,
2011), https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-claims-subsidies-victory-in-boeingcase/ [perma.cc/JRY2-7LKW].
121 Id.
122 Ekblom, supra note 11.
123 Id.; see also Part III, supra.
115
116
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2017.124 Nevertheless, the initial counter-case that was filed in
2004 continued, with the WTO ruling in 2019 that the United
States had failed to attain compliance with their earlier ruling
against the 2003 Washington State tax breaks.125
B.

THE CURRENT STATE

OF THE

DISPUTE

Despite the fact that disputes at the WTO usually only take
around three years to resolve, the dispute between the United
States and the EU over civilian aircraft subsidies has lasted over
fifteen.126 After the WTO’s final ruling on the EU subsidies in
2018, the United States entered arbitration to determine the
scope of the retaliatory tariffs that could be imposed on EU
goods entering the country.127
On October 2, 2019, the WTO arbitrator issued a ruling stating that the United States would be allowed to impose up to $7.5
billion worth of tariffs on EU goods imported into the country.128 This record-breaking authorization confirmed what both
parties had been anticipating; indeed, the United States had
earlier that year published a long list of EU goods that would be
affected by an authorization to impose tariffs.129 These goods
included items like French cheeses and wines, Irish and Scotch
whiskies, Italian cashmeres, and German knives—all subject to
up to 25% tariffs.130
With permission from the arbitrator to impose the high dollar
tariffs, the United States implemented the tariffs almost immediately in October 2019.131 Perhaps wanting to send a stronger
message to the EU to get them to comply with prior WTO rulings, the Trade Representative is presently deciding whether to
Ekblom, supra note 11.
WTO Dispute Summary, supra note 110.
126 Sabri Ben-Achour, EU Gave Illegal Subsidies to Airbus, WTO Rules, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.marketplace.org/2019/10/02/wto-rules-eugave-illegal-subsidies-airbus/ [perma.cc/59K2-C3S6].
127 Ekblom, supra note 11.
128 Stephanie Nebehay, WTO Clears U.S. to Target EU Goods with Tariffs Over
Airbus, REUTERS (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wto-aircraft
/wto-clears-u-s-to-target-eu-goods-with-tariffs-over-airbus-idUSKBN1WT0T2
[https://perma.cc/9GSV-FDX4].
129 Enforcement of U.S. WTO Rights in Large Civil Aircraft Dispute, 84 Fed.
Reg. 32,248, 32,249–51 (July 5, 2019).
130 Id.; Thomas Franck, US Weighing 100% Tariffs on more EU Products Including
Whiskies and Cognac, According to Documents, CNBC (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.
cnbc.com/2019/12/13/ustr-weighing-100percent-tariffs-on-new-eu-products-including-whiskies.html [perma.cc/2D8T-L5CP].
131 Franck, supra note 130.
124
125
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raise the current tariffs to a staggering 100%, as well as impose
tariffs on new goods that were not previously affected.132 In the
meantime, both parties are awaiting a final ruling in the EU
counter-case.133
C.

OBSTACLES COMPLICATING CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

There are several issues that make the path forward toward a
solution complicated. First, and perhaps most importantly, the
U.S. government has become increasingly wary of cooperative
trade agreements under the Trump Administration, moving toward a protectionist strategy across all areas of trade over the last
three years.134 After many decades marked by free trade deals,
American policymakers on both sides of the political spectrum
have become wary given the seemingly overwhelming growth of
other countries’ economies and the perceived stagnancy of the
U.S. export machine.135 Given the fact that the United States has
been seemingly vindicated by multiple WTO verdicts in their
favor, it does seem unlikely that they will be incentivized to back
off the pressure on the EU’s Airbus subsidies.
Additionally, there is a lot at stake for a very large U.S. company—Boeing has seen losses over the last few years due not
only to increased competition from Airbus, but also its own internal failures. In October 2018, a new Boeing 737 MAX aircraft
crashed in Indonesia shortly after takeoff, with the cause of the
crash determined to be the plane’s automatic safety system.136
Only five months later, another 737 MAX crashed in Ethiopia
shortly after takeoff, with the cause determined to be the same
Id.
Peggy Hollinger, What Is at Stake in WTO Ruling on Airbus-Boeing Trade Dispute?, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/de3f9c12-e3a011e9-9743-db5a370481bc [perma.cc/N8LC-P5QB].
134 See, e.g., Keith Johnson, Trump Turns Global Trade Upside Down, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Dec. 23, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/23/trump-trade-warchina-us-2019/ [perma.cc/RLD6-CMD9]; Jim Tankersley, Trump Bets the U.S.
Economy on Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
05/31/business/trump-economy-tariffs-election.html [perma.cc/7JPC-EJSS];
Toby Chopra & Keith Weir, Trump Threatens Big Tariffs on Car Imports from EU,
REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-davos-meetingtrump-trade/trump-threatens-big-tariffs-on-car-imports-from-eu-if-no-trade-dealstruck-cnbc-idUSKBN1ZL1GK [perma.cc/6VCW-BSY8].
135 Johnson, supra note 134.
136 Timeline: Boeing 737 Max Jetliner Crashes and Aftermath, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 14,
2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-viz-boeing-737-maxcrash-timeline-04022019-story.html [perma.cc/YC4B-B68H].
132
133
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autopilot issue.137 This led to an immediate grounding of the
737 MAX in U.S. airspace, with a global grounding following
shortly thereafter.138 As a result of the global grounding and additional cancellations of 737 MAX orders from airlines around
the world, Boeing was projected to have lost out in over one
billion dollars of revenue.139 Boeing has also been forced to temporarily shutter manufacturing plants that support the 737
MAX, bringing its tax status and benefits in some states into
question.140
Further, as a result of Boeing’s problems with their newest
aircraft product, the company is beginning to fall even further
behind Airbus in terms of the global market share.141 Airbus’
market share is estimated to have grown “to almost 62.5% in
2019 due to the sizable reduction in deliveries for Boeing.”142
Airbus’s chief rival to the 737 MAX—the A320neo—has seen a
surge in orders since the American company’s grounding order.143 In total, Airbus logged a net gross of 1,131 aircraft orders
in 2019, delivering 863 aircraft in the same timeframe.144 Comparatively, Boeing reported a gross order number of 246 air137 Alex Davies, Crashed Ethiopian Air Jet is Same Model as Lion Air Accident, WIRED
(Mar. 10, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/crashed-ethiopian-air-jet-samemodel-lion-air-accident/ [perma.cc/3CWU-JRZY].
138 See, e.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., EMERGENCY ORDER OF PROHIBITION (Mar. 13,
2019), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/Emergency_Order.pdf [per
ma.cc/C53H-8LBF]; Chris Isidore, The Boeing 737 Max Grounding: No End in Sight,
CNN BUS. (June 11, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/11/business/boeing-737-grounding/index.html [perma.cc/N8JM-RVJ2]; Elijah Shama, Boeing Reports No New Orders of 737 Max as Worldwide Grounding Enters Sixth Month, CNBC
(Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/13/boeing-reports-no-new-orders-of-737-max-as-grounding-enters-sixth-month.html [perma.cc/6ZJF-MBF5].
139 Dominic Rushe & Rob Davies, Boeing: Global Grounding of 737 Max Will Cost
Company More Than $1bn, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2019), https://
www.theguardian.com/business/2019/apr/24/global-grounding-of-boeing-737MAX-will-cost-company-more-than-1bn [perma.cc/KN3K-Q3F9].
140 See Brittany Chang, Photos Show Why Boeing Had to Stop Production of Its
Grounded 737 Max and Its Supplier Was Forced to Layoff Thousands of Employees, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-MAX-airplanes-halt-production-aircraft-backlog-2019-12 [perma.cc/3UVT-2LSJ].
141 Trefis Team, supra note 15.
142 Id.
143 Benjamin Katz, Airbus Pulls Far Ahead of Boeing in New Jet Orders, Deliveries,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/airbus-pulls-far-aheadof-boeing-in-new-jet-orders-deliveries-11572369091 [perma.cc/26V7-VSHZ].
144 Tim Hepher, Airbus Net Orders Rise but Lag Behind Deliveries in 2019, REUTERS
(Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbus-orders/airbus-net-orders-rise-but-lag-behind-deliveries-in-2019-idUSKBN1Z92CW [perma.cc/BW482W29].

378

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[85

craft, with its “worst annual net orders in decades . . . [and] its
lowest numbers for plane deliveries in 11 years.”145 As a result,
the United States has an added urgency to be harsher on European aircraft imports in order to attempt to protect Boeing’s
flailing business.
Currently, the EU and the United States are at an impasse,
with the United States having already implemented billions of
dollars’ worth of tariffs on EU goods, and the EU threatening to
propose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products.146 Since the Boeing
and Airbus disagreement is not the only trade qualm that the
United States currently has with the EU,147 one could potentially
assume that the best way to solve the issue would be a broad,
bilateral trade agreement that encompasses many different areas of concern for both countries. This, however, is the incorrect approach. Given the complex and complicated history
surrounding the Boeing and Airbus trade dispute, the best solution is to craft a new agreement, specific to large civilian aircraft
manufacturing and sale, that encompasses the spirit of the original 1992 bilateral agreement while improving on what made it
fail in 2004.
V.

A NEW PROPOSAL

Moving forward, it is crucial that the United States and the
EU make it a priority to craft a new bilateral trade agreement
that addresses the concerns both sides have about civilian aircraft manufacturing. In today’s political climate, with one side
continuing the trend toward outright protectionism and the
other side growing increasingly concerned about impending
changes to its membership and economy,148 both parties must
find common ground that allows them to protect their imporTim Hepher et al., Boeing Net Orders Slump to Lowest in Decades, REUTERS (Jan.
14, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-deliveries/boeing-net-orders-slump-to-lowest-in-decades-idUSKBN1ZD233 [perma.cc/2GLA-D4BZ].
146 Saloni Sardana, US Weighting New Tariffs on $3.1 Billion of European Goods,
with Products Like Olives, Beer, Gin, and Planes on the List, BUS. INSIDER (June 24,
2020), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/trade-war-us-tariffs-europe-3-billion-new-notice-2020-6-1029337397# [https://perma.cc/9B3V-45QT]
(quoting EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan).
147 See James Politi et al., France Signals Breakthrough in US Digital Tax Talks, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/345a5850-3ba1-11ea-b232000f4477fbca [perma.cc/G32N-RHSS].
148 See Laurence Norman & Stephen Fidler, After Brexit, Fractured EU Faces New
Challenges, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/afterbrexit-fractured-eu-faces-new-challenges-11576341003 [perma.cc/4GKA-7E7Y].
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tant domestic industries while remaining participants in the
global market.
A.

BOEING’S EFFORTS

TO

AVOID SANCTIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH

In a very recent development in the ongoing dispute, the
United States indicated that it may be willing to give a little in
order to avoid a potentially devastating adverse WTO ruling on
sanctions. At Boeing’s urging, lawmakers in Washington State
introduced a bill to the state legislature that would completely
eliminate tax breaks for Boeing in the state.149 It is clear that the
United States is hopeful that by eliminating the tax breaks for
Boeing, they might avoid a harsh ruling by the WTO that enables the EU to impose high tariffs on agricultural goods.150 But
lawmakers may incorrectly assume that revoking the tax breaks
will be enough to solve the current dispute, let alone additional
disputes in the future.
Further, this attempt by U.S. lawmakers to ease tensions is directly at odds with the recent decision by the Trade Representative to increase the import duty on Airbus aircraft from ten to
fifteen percent.151 The Trade Representative added that these
duties will only increase should the EU be granted the right to
retaliate with similar duties on Boeing aircraft, an authorization
which is expected sometime in 2020.152 Airbus has rightly noted
that the increase in import duty would create “more instability
for U.S. airlines that are already suffering from a shortage of
aircraft,”153 striking a tone that hardly seems conciliatory in light
of the United States and Boeing’s recent attempt at a truce. Indeed, taken with the import duty increase, Airbus and the EU
likely see the revocation of the tax breaks as a temporary and
insincere effort to get the WTO to back off of a potentially devastating adverse ruling. Because of their unlikely long-term success, hasty attempts like this should be abandoned in favor of a
new and broad bilateral agreement that will prevent similar future disputes.
149 Nelson D. Schwartz, Boeing, to Fend Off Sanctions, Backs Ending State Tax
Breaks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/business/boeing-subsidies-wto.html [perma.cc/4GKA-7E7Y].
150 Id.
151 Cathy Buyck, U.S. Ups Import Duty Rate on New Airbus Aircraft, AVIATION INT’L
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/
2020-02-17/us-ups-import-duty-rate-new-airbus-aircraft [perma.cc/ZZM3-G44D].
152 Id.
153 Id. (quoting an Airbus spokesperson).
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BEST WAY FORWARD

Perhaps the best way to craft a new agreement would be to
start by using the 1992 Agreement as a model. Although the
1992 Agreement was not ultimately successful in governing the
U.S.–EU trade relationship, it could serve as a starting point for
a new agreement in this uncertain climate. The biggest issue
with the 1992 Agreement was that it failed to define what qualified as a “subsidy” that would give rise to a violation of the agreement.154 While both the EU and the United States want the
other side to refrain from providing subsidies to their respective
aircraft manufacturers, it is unlikely that either side will be willing to quit the practice altogether. As a result, the most beneficial solution will be to clearly define how much of a subsidy is
acceptable given the current economic circumstances and the
realities of doing business in the twenty-first century.
First, if the EU and the United States agree that their respective governments have a role to play in maintaining the success
of their civilian aircraft manufacturers, the limits of their allowed contributions must be clearly defined and not left up to
interpretation. The 1992 Agreement allowed countries to contribute up to 33% of the cost of the financing of a new aircraft
model as long as the loan is repaid at an interest rate no lower
than the cost of borrowing.155 But just last year, Airbus strongly
indicated that they would not be open to repaying loans given
by EU nations because the issuance of the loans are part of a
“risk partnership” between the manufacturer and the governments.156 Thus, because Airbus never profited off of the planes
that benefited from the loans, they are not obligated to pay the
governments back.157 This kind of exchange understandably
frustrates the United States, which has outwardly been against
large-scale subsidization of national industry. A new agreement
should make Airbus’ repayment of any government loan
mandatory, regardless of the success or failure of the financed
aircraft, in order to ensure that they are facing risks similar to
other manufacturers. Further, because the loan model is used
See Part III, supra.
1992 Agreement, supra note 45, art. 4.
156 Pfeifer, supra note 37 (quoting Airbus Chief Executive Officer Tom
Enders).
157 Andreas Rinke & Tassilo Hummel, Germany in Talks with Airbus on 600 Million Euros of A380 Loans, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airbus-germany/germany-in-talks-with-airbus-on-600-million-euros-of-a380loans-idUSKCN1QL0YR [perma.cc/GH5M-8WQH].
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almost exclusively in Europe, the two governments should agree
to set the total contribution percentage at a similar rate as any
tax subsidy given to American manufacturers in the United
States.
In the same vein, the new agreement will need to clearly define how much of a tax break is appropriate given the American
tendency to resort to such measures in order to fund new developments in aircraft manufacturing. Recently, public sentiment
in the United States has started to turn against these measures,
which its most fervent detractors call “corporate welfare.”158
Washington Governor Jay Inslee, once Boeing’s most devoted
public champion,159 has gone as far as to compare the Boeing
tax break to a mugging.160 The dissatisfaction is not just contained to the Boeing tax breaks, either; taxpayers have begun to
speak out against similar tax breaks in other industries as well.161
This growing public opposition in the United States could become leverage for Airbus. If the United States and Boeing are
politically disincentivized to seek large tax breaks for the industry domestically, Airbus could push even harder for caps on the
amount that the United States is allowed to subsidize through
such tax breaks.
Further leverage can be found in the overwhelming evidence
of the limited success of Boeing’s tax breaks. Despite the large
amount of money that Boeing saves as a result of its deal with
Washington State, Airbus still managed to overtake Boeing in
158 Paul Constant, It’s Time to End Corporate Welfare. Boeing is Exhibit A for Why,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/its-time-to-endcorporate-welfare-boeing-is-exhibit-a-2020-1/ [perma.cc/R2M3-LEAF].
159 Jerry Cornfield, Inslee Urges Boeing to Build Its New Jet in Washington, HERALDNET (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.heraldnet.com/news/inslee-urges-boeingto-build-its-new-jet-in-state/ [perma.cc/FX97-AYUL].
160 Constant, supra note 158 (“‘These corporations put a gun to your ribs and
say you’re going to lose 20,000 jobs’ unless you hand over the tax breaks, Inslee
explained.”).
161 See generally Richard Fausset, A School Board Says No to Big Oil, and Alarms
Sound in Business-Friendly Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/02/05/us/louisiana-itep-exxon-mobil.html [perma.cc/
6WKP-6D7J] (highlighting how opposition to even small tax breaks is taking hold
in areas previously thought to be relentlessly business-friendly); Joseph Spector,
Amazon Pulls Out of Plan to Build HQ2 in New York City Amid Political Opposition,
USA TODAY (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/
2019/02/14/amazon-hq-nyc-dropped-amid-local-political-opposition/2870
130002/ [perma.cc/W9WA-3TY6] (detailing New York City’s recent organized
opposition to tax breaks to induce Amazon to build a second headquarters
locally).
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market share for the first time in its history.162 The same year
that Boeing received the record-breaking tax cut, the company
laid off 6,000 local workers; it is further estimated that “Boeing
cut nearly 13,000 Washington jobs between the announcement
of the tax break and the end of 2017.”163 Negotiators for the EU
should point to this limited success as a reason why the current
U.S. model for tax breaks should be abandoned in favor of a
bilateral agreement.
C.

WHY IT MATTERS

The dispute between the EU and the United States over such
a critical industry has broader implications that go beyond the
industry itself. First, resolving this dispute and coming to an amicable arrangement could go a long way in striking a conciliatory
tone in future trade disputes between the two government entities. The aircraft industry is not the only issue between the EU
and the United States. With President Trump’s high aspirations
at the global negotiating table to protect America’s domestic industries,164 future disputes between the two governments have
the potential to be just as prolonged. Trump has set his sights
on the EU specifically as the next front of his broader trade war,
threatening to impose tariffs on automobiles that “would cause
immense and immediate pain for U.S. manufacturers and consumers, destroying hundreds of thousands of jobs and raising
the cost of new cars by thousands of dollars.”165
Further, neither country can afford the high tariffs that they
are currently imposing on the other country’s aircraft. Airlines
from both the EU and the United States rely on Boeing and
Airbus to supply aircraft, and since Boeing is currently in the
midst of its own supply crisis with the grounding of the 737
MAX,166 making it more difficult and expensive to adjust for this
deficit will likely only make matters worse. Additionally, because
of the long lead time that aircraft orders and deliveries reSee Trefis Team, supra note 15.
Constant, supra note 158.
164 See Larry Elliott, Trump Latest in Long Line of Protectionists Steering U.S. Trade
Policy, GUARDIAN (May 10, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/
may/10/trump-latest-in-long-line-of-protectionists-steering-us-trade-policy [per
ma.cc/P2M9-PE68].
165 Keith Johnson, Europe is the New Front in Trump’s Trade War, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Jan. 23, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/23/europe-new-fronttrump-trade-war-davos-wef/ [perma.cc/RLD6-CMD9].
166 See Part IV, supra.
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quire,167 airlines placed orders for impacted aircraft years ago
and are now stuck with the increased price unexpectedly. For
example, Delta Air Lines (Delta)—the second largest airline in
the United States—has almost three hundred aircraft on order
from Airbus, exposing Delta the most to the additional costs associated with the tariffs.168 Although Delta and other airlines
have lobbied for the tariffs to be applied only to orders of new
aircraft,169 such a move is unlikely given the desired impact of
the tariffs. Currently, the most likely scenario is that these tariffs
will continue to be imposed and enforced with a possibility of
rising as the dispute stretches on. This will only get worse if an
agreement is not reached before the WTO issues its ruling on
the amount of tariffs the EU can impose on U.S. aircraft.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is clear that the current actions by the EU
and the United States are not satisfactory solutions to the longrunning trade dispute that has plagued the large civilian aircraft
industry for more than two decades. Despite the fact that the
United States seems to have secured a temporary victory in the
form of retaliatory tariffs, the EU will almost surely secure a similar victory in just a few months’ time, placing the dispute firmly
back at square one. The devastating effects of prolonging the
dispute even more, compounded by the already heightened tensions between the two governments on the world stage, underscore the urgency of coming to a new bilateral agreement
specific to civilian aircraft. Because it is unlikely that the EU and
the United States will actually abandon the practice of subsidizing their respective aircraft manufacturers—especially in a
time of uncertainty and turmoil in the large civilian aircraft industry—it is important that the two governments clearly define
what will be acceptable moving forward and agree to adhere to
such terms. Without such an agreement, the uncertain impact
of further tariffs on such a wide range of goods will surely damSee Jason Rabinowitz, The Incredible Process Behind Buying a Fleet of Airplanes,
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-incredibleprocess-behind-buying-a-fleet-of-airplanes-2013-11 [perma.cc/RY8B-NHFT].
168 David Shepardson & Tracy Rucinski, U.S. Airlines Grapple with ‘Unfair Tax’
that Adds to Aircraft Supply Disruption, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-wto-aircraft-airlines/u-s-airlines-grapple-with-unfair-taxthat-adds-to-aircraft-supply-disruption-idUSKBN1WJ1YS [perma.cc/QCK5-EX77].
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age each country’s economy, the confidence of the consumers
who purchase these goods, and the future relationship between
the EU and the United States at large.

